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1.  Introduction 
 
The brain drain has been a prominent concern in many developing countries since the 1960s. 
The migration of doctors in particular has received considerable attention
1. To date, however, 
discussion among economists has generally been more reliant on theory and anecdote than on 
formal data analysis. Empirical research concerning medical migration, or even on the brain 
drain from sending country’s point of view in general, has been scarce
2. 
It is often assumed in public discussion that brain drain is an unambiguously negative 
phenomenon. Theory, however, has suggested that it can be beneficial, e.g. if migrants 
establish commercial networks abroad, remit significant amounts of income or technology, or 
return with greater skills, or if the possibility of migration increases the incentives to obtain 
education (Mountford, 1997). Despite the prominence of the last in theoretical discussion, 
under the heading of “beneficial brain drain” there have been few tests of its relevance or 
size. Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2002) study the beneficial brain drain at the economy 
wide level, but we know of no studies regarding the possibility of beneficial brain drain on 
specific sectors. Since the choice of education is unlikely to concern only the length and level 
of general education but also its nature and the future professions it supports, such a sectoral 
view can yield important insights. This paper aims to fill some of this gap, or at least to serve 
as a stepping stone for future research through and empirical study of medical migration into 
the UK. 
The UK’s National Health Service (NHS) has always employed overseas doctors, 
especially those from Indian subcontinent. In the mid-1980s, however, it was still believed 
that the United Kingdom would face an excess supply of doctors by the end of the 
millennium, and that the intake of British medical schools should be cut down. In the late 
1980s and 1990s, however, NHS reforms, demographic change and various other factors 
caused the demand for doctors to increase substantially, and an increasing number of 
overseas doctors was needed to fill the gaps (Rivett 1997). Most of these doctors come to the 
UK to fill basic specialist training posts, many with the intention of pursuing higher specialist 
training later. Basic specialist training posts provide training, but are held by fully qualified 
doctors and are key to the delivery of health care in the NHS. Indeed, the system is now 
heavily dependent on overseas recruits. Until now it has not been clear how large a fraction 
                                                                 
1 See, for example, Beecham 2002, Bundred and Levitt 2000. 
2 Some of the few examples of the former are an article by Goldfarb et. al (1984) who examine the outflow of 
Philippine physicians and remittances sent by them and Findlay et al’s (1994) analysis of the length of Hong Kong 
doctors’ employment abroad.   4
of overseas doctors intend to stay in the UK after their training, nor how many actually end 
up staying. However, it is clear that there is scope for a major brain drain from developing 
countries via this route. 
The present study is based on a small telephone (and in a few cases postal) survey of 
overseas doctors working in the United Kingdom. This approach has obvious weaknesses – 
for example, that we are not able to compare the migrant doctors with their peers who did not 
move and that the data are necessarily based on subjective statements given by the migrant 
doctors themselves – but we believe that it is sufficiently useful to shed at least some new 
light on what is a major policy issue. 
Our principal aim is to establish some facts regarding the influence that migration 
possibilities have on the educational decisions of individual doctors, and to explore the extent 
to which migrant doctors to the UK are screened for ability. These are the two fundamental 
links in the beneficial brain drain hypothesis, and although our sample is small and subject to 
limitations, this will constitute, to our knowledge, the first attempt to study the relevance of 
the hypothesis at sectoral level. In addition to the main issues we also enquired about other 
issues that might influence the total cost or benefit of migration, such as return intentions, 
remittances and which sector they intend to work in after their return. 
The structure of this paper is the following. In section II we summarise the main 
theoretical considerations concerning the brain drain. In section III we describe the UK 
National Health System and the ways in which overseas doctors enter the system. In section 
IV we describe our data set. Section V presents the results of the survey and tests some 
simple hypotheses concerning screening of applicants and section VI concludes. 
  
 
2.  Theoretical background
3 
 
Some of the earliest work on the brain drain – particularly Grubel and Scott (1966) – was set 
in the context of perfectly competitive markets. With all markets clearing, wages set equal to 
marginal product and no externalities, there was evidently no welfare impact on those left 
behind.
4 Subsequent research overturned this by introducing distortions between the social 
and private marginal product and/or a public subsidy for education. Bhagwati and Hamada 
                                                                 
3 Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters (2002) provide a fuller account of the literature. 
4 Johnson (1967), however, points out that the effect actually depends on how much capital the emigrants take with 
them. If capital is internationally mobile this argument does not hold.   5
(1974), for example, introduced institutional constraints on wage setting and the financing of 
education, while Bhagwati and Hamada (1975) introduced further ‘refinements’ to labour 
markets in the sending countries, such as emigration allowing, in particular circumstances, 
better matching of skilled workers to jobs. A number of dynamic models  – particularly 
Rodriguez (1975) – had similar points of departure including, inter alia, a Harris-Todaro 
labour market and sticky wages. 
More recent models of the brain drain have introduced the possibility of a beneficial 
brain drain through education incentives. The central proposition is that if the possibility of 
emigration encourages more skill-creation than skill-loss, sending (or home) countries might 
increase their stocks of skills as opportunities to move or work abroad open up. If, in 
addition, this accumulation of skills has beneficial effects beyond the strictly private gains 
anticipated by those who acquire the skills, the whole economy can benefit. Examples of such 
benefits include enhanced intergenerational transmission of skills and education (Vidal, 
1998) and spillovers between skilled workers (Mountford, 1997). 
There are two critical features of these models. The first is the nature of the social 
benefit resulting from higher skills, for which several approaches are evident. In the simplest 
form Stark, Helmenstein and  Prskawetz (1997, 1998) merely assume that increasing the 
average skill level of the sending economy is desirable. Mountford (1997) postulates a 
production externality whereby the productivity of current labour depends positively on the 
share of the population who had education in the previous period. Beine, Docquier and 
Rapaport (2001a) formalise this by allowing the average skill of one generation to pass 
directly to the next, who can then build on it by taking education. In all these cases, 
emigration has a negative direct effect by draining skilled labour out of the sending economy 
- a ‘drain’ effect - but a potentially beneficial effect by encouraging human capital formation 
- a ‘brain’ effect. 
The second critical issue for the beneficial brain drain is the mechanism that generates 
an increased incentive to acquire education but leaves some skilled workers back at home. 
All the current literature starts with wages for given levels of skills/ ability being higher 
abroad than at home. From there, the predominant approach  – Mountford (1997), Stark, 
Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1998), Vidal (1998) and Beine, Docquier and Rapaport (2001a) 
– has been to assume that there is uncertainty about the ability to migrate, so that of N who 
acquire education only pN (p < 1) actually emigrate. If p were unity, a permanent brain-drain 
could not be beneficial as all the incremental education would be lost. A further critical 
assumption is that the probability of migration is fixed and exogenously given for any   6
individual would-be migrant. This implicitly arises because foreign firms cannot screen 
migrants to distinguish the able from the less able and it is this market failure that makes it 
possible for the brain-drain to be beneficial. 
We can illustrate the importance of this assumption, using a highly simplified model 
which nonetheless captures Mountford's (1997) important insight. Following Beine, Docquier 
and Rapaport (2001a), assume that ability is uniformly distributed between Amin and Amax 
and that education yields private returns that increase with ability, as in the line in Figure 1, 
"with educ". With a given cost of education, people with ability between A* and Amax find it 
profitable to take education. Now, allow for the possibility of migration for educated people. 
If an individual can migrate, his or her private returns increase to the line "with educ and 
mign". With a probability of migration 0 < p < 1, the expected returns to education lie 
between the domestic and emigration rates of return - say along "E (with educ and mign)", 
and individuals between A** and Amax will take education. Of these, however, a proportion, 
p, will emigrate leaving the domestic economy with (1 - p) (Amax - A**) educated people, 
which may or may not exceed ( Amax  - A *). Adding social returns to education is 
conceptually simple, for they have no immediate effect on private decisions. For simplicity, 
let social benefits be proportional to the stock of educated workers remaining at home, i.e. d 
(Amax - A*) with no migration, and d (1 - p) (Amax - A**) with migration. 
The possibility of migration raises expected welfare for anyone who takes education. 
Hence there is an increase in aggregate private income, although, of course, some individuals 
who do not manage to emigrate will regret their education decisions ex post. The uneducated 
see no direct change in private returns and welfare and consequently gross private income 
rises when migration is permitted. What happens to aggregate welfare, of course, depends on 
the social benefits of education. 
Fundamental to this story is that every educated individual has probability p of 
emigrating - hence all of them experience increased expected returns, so that in our linear 
example line "E (with educ and mign)" lies uniformly above "with educ". But now suppose 
that the country or organisation of immigration can screen migrants perfectly for ability. They 
admit immigrants but only from the top echelons, so that if, say, they want M people from our 
target country, they get the top M lying between AM and Amax in Figure 2. If this is known in 
advance, the incentives for individuals with ability below  AM are unchanged. The private 
returns to education follow the thick line in Figure 2. (Amax - A*) are educated, of whom (AM 
- A*) remain. The increment to total private income is larger than if the migrants had been   7
randomly selected, because the same number of migrants makes gains but no-one makes ex 
post education decisions that they regret. However, there is a loss of social welfare of dM. 
Clearly perfect screening is implausible, but even with imperfect screening all that 
would happen is that the vertical section of the thick private returns line would become 
sloped. But for so long as it meets "with educ" above A*, offering migration would affect no-
one's education decisions. Thus, a necessary criterion for a beneficial brain drain to have any 
chance of applying is that the marginal person in education has a positive probability of 
emigrating.   
Of course, actual decisions about education are taken with respect to subjective 
probabilities of migration not ex post observed probabilities. Thus, if individuals are overly 
optimistic about their prospects, marginal candidates may believe they face improved 
expected returns even when they do not. In line with most long-run modelling, however, one 
might wish to discount ever-lasting errors of this sort and presume that eventually subjective 
probabilities converge to actual ones.  
The importance of effective screening is also evident in Stark, Helmenstein and 
Prskawetz (1997) who distinguish between education and innate ability. For them, the 
increased incentive to acquire education among less able workers is that, while foreign firms 
can recognise educational qualifications they cannot, at first, distinguish high from low 
ability workers. As a result, for a period they offer all migrants with a given level of 
education the same wage (the mean level averaged over ability for that level of education), 
with the consequence that less able workers are ‘over-paid’. Over time foreign firms may 
discern workers' true ability and offer 'appropriate' wages, at which time the benefits of 
emigration erode and, at least with finite probability, the workers return home. Even if they 
have acquired no skills or networks abroad, they are better educated than they would have 
been in the absence of migration. In this case it is precisely the imperfections in screening - 
how quickly and with what probability foreign firms discern true ability  - that create the 
incentives to acquire education. 
A possible development of the screening model is that the sending or home country 
has some unexploited capacity for education, in the sense that the returns to education are 
primarily determined by the demand for skilled workers rather than the ability of the 
population. In this case even a perfectly screened emigration would generate net benefits. 
Suppose that as the workers between AM and Amax migrated, they left openings for newly 
educated workers to take jobs with precisely the same returns. The net effect on the home 
economy would be that it would have the same number of educated workers as without   8
migration and hence the same spillovers, but M fewer uneducated workers. This would raise 
average incomes slightly (and average skill-levels). In addition, the migrants would record 
positive private gains.   9
3.  Foreign doctors in the United Kingdom 
 
3.1   Background 
 
All doctors working in the United Kingdom have to be registered with the General Medical 
Council. The General Medical Council records the place where initial qualification was 
obtained and thus provides some information on the origin of doctors. There are different 
types of registration status which also give an indication on the post and career progress of 
the overseas doctor. 
The types of status of most relevance for overseas (non-EEA
5) doctors are ‘limited’ 
and ‘full’ registration. Full registration is the normal registration status for UK and EEA 
doctors who have a medical degree and who have completed their initial period of training or 
PRHO (pre-registration house officer). Limited registration is initially given to non-EEA 
doctors (with some exceptions, described below) and allows them to work under supervision 
until they have proven their clinical ability to be at the level expected from doctors working 
independently in the United Kingdom. The doctor will obtain limited registration only when 
he or she has an offer of suitable employment. 
The number of overseas (non-EEA) qualified doctors currently in the register is not 
available (the total number of doctors in the register is 193 000
6). The number of new doctors 
arriving from overseas was 2763 in 2000 (32% of the total number of new registrants), 
having been as high as around 40% of the new registrants in the 1990’s (General Medical 
Council, Table 1). The majority of new overseas doctors initially obtain limited registration, 
although graduates from certain Commonwealth Universities are for historical reasons 
eligible for full registration immediately. In recent years 25-30% of those having limited 
registration have converted it into a full registration every year (General Medical Council). 
The average period of holding limited registration is just under three years. The main sending 
non-EEA countries are India and Pakistan. 
Another important source of information is the Department of Health Workforce 
census of NHS medical staff. At present over 100 000 doctors are practising in the NHS. 
Department of Health figures show that approximately 25% of hospital doctors qualified 
outside EEA (Table 2). 
                                                                 
5 EEA (European Economic Area) doctors (EEA citizens trained in EEA) are automatically guaranteed full 
registration in the UK. 
6 Not all  registered doctors practice in the UK.   10
 
3.2  Routes of Entry for Foreign Doctors 
 
Migration of overseas doctors to the United Kingdom is closely tied to the postgraduate 
training system. The aim has been to employ overseas doctors in training posts, thus 
providing the NHS with employable staff, and simultaneously allowing doctors from 
developing countries to obtain their postgraduate training that can be subsequently used in 
their own country. It is also possible for fully trained doctors to work in the United Kingdom, 
but this route is less common. In the following section we describe the system of medical 
training in the United Kingdom and the visa and work permit arrangements relevant for 
doctors and assess the importance of different routes of entry. 
 
Medical education and postgraduate training in the United Kingdom 
 
The initial stage of medical education in the United Kingdom is university undergraduate 
education, which takes five or six years. Graduation from medical school is followed by a 
Pre-Registration House Officer (PRHO) year which is still the responsibility of the university 
and consists of two six month training posts. During this period the trainee is not fully 
registered with the GMC having only provisional registration. 
The next stage of postgraduate training is basic specialist training or the time spent in 
the Senior House Officer Grade (2-3 years). This stage does not lead to the award of a formal 
certificate, but after basic specialist training the doctor can work in staff grade posts. The 
subsequent higher specialist training (4-6 years), which takes place in the Specialist Registrar 
(SpR) grade, entitles the doctor to be awarded a Certificate of Completion of Specialist 
Training (CCST). The holders of CCST who are in GMC’s specialist register can work as 
consultants. Entry to higher specialist training is highly regulated and requires admission into 
a specialist training programme. 
In addition to these forms of training, there are arrangements specifically for overseas 
doctors in the UK that do not lead to any formal qualifications or do not take the form of paid 
employment. So-called clinical attachments are typically used by foreign doctors to obtain 
clinical experience in the UK which can help in getting a training post. They can be done 
without registration and with visitor immigration status but are not paid for and do not 
provide direct patient access. Clinical attachments normally last between two and four 
months.   11
At higher specialist training level Fixed Term Training Attachments (FTTAs, or type 
II specialist training posts) provide the opportunity to obtain six months to two years of 
specialist training for those without indefinite rights of residence in the UK. Unlike standard 
higher specialist training they do not lead to the award of a certificate. 
Not all doctors want to pursue all these training levels and the number of people 
admitted to training would not even allow this. After basic specialist training a doctor can 
work at staff grade level posts and after higher specialist training they can be appointed as 
consultants which is the most senior post. Those specialist-trained doctors who are unable to 
obtain consultant posts can work as associate specialists. 
General Practitioners are trained in a separate vocational training system. This 
training lasts three years out of which at least 12 months has to be spent in general practice 
and 12 months in approved hospital posts. GP training often takes place in training schemes. 
Training abroad can also be taken into account, if considered relevant. The general practice 
element of GP training requires full registration. There used to be severe restrictions on the 
availability of funding for doctors who do not have rights of residence or indefinite leave to 
remain in the UK, but since November 2001 they are eligible for the same funding as 
UK/EEA applicants. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
How foreign individuals enter the system 
 
It is possible for overseas students to undertake undergraduate studies in medicine in the UK 
medical schools. The number of places is, however, very limited, and the cost for overseas 
(non-EEA) students is high, approx. £16,500 per year. Those overseas students who choose 
to pursue a medical degree can be allowed to stay in the United Kingdom to complete their 
postgraduate general clinical and basic specialist training. 
Most foreign doctors enter the system with an undergraduate qualification from their 
own country. For the degree to be recognised in the United Kingdom the medical school 
would have to be included in the WHO list of medical schools. It is usually expected that 
overseas doctors also complete PRHO or corresponding clinical training in their own country. 
In order to be able to register in the United Kingdom they will also have to take a 
Professional and Linguistic Assessment Board (PLAB) test to prove their professional skills, 
as well as a separate language test (IELTS) if English is not their first language. Those who 
are part of special placement schemes are, however, exempted from the PLAB. The share of 
doctors who are exempted from the PLAB of those obtaining initial limited registration has   12
been approximately 40% (Davis 2000). Some other special conditions like completion of 
basic specialist training to the satisfaction of the appropriate UK specialist training body, 
appointment to a Type 1 specialist registrar post (i.e. a post approved for training leading to 
CCST), eligibility for specialist registration or long experience can also qualify the doctor for 
PLAB exemption. Indian doctors use the PLAB route more often than doctors coming from 
other countries. 
EEA trained doctors who are EEA citizens, as well as graduates from  certain 
universities in Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, Singapore, South Africa, Hong Kong and the 
West Indies can obtain full registration with the GMC after their PRHO. Other overseas 
doctors (who have either passed PLAB or been exempted from it) usually get limited 
registration initially and this allows them to work in the UK under supervision. 
Doctors in training have special immigration arrangements: they have so-called 
permit-free status and thus they do not need a work permit. They can apply for this status 
after having been appointed to a post. Doctors pursuing PRHO have an initial grant of a 
maximum of 12 months that can be extended only with special permission. Doctors 
undertaking basic or higher specialist training for a fixed period are granted permit-free status 
for the period of training.  Doctors participating in basic specialist or general professional 
training or holding appointments in the SHO grade are granted three years of permit-free 
status, with possible extension for one year. Similarly doctors qualifying for higher specialist 
training will be granted an initial period of permit-free training for a maximum of three years 
with possible extensions.  Those doctors who enter career grades (i.e. non-training hospital 
grades) need a normal work permit that their employer will apply for. 
Doctors doing GP training will get the permit-free status for the hospital-based parts 
of the training but require a training and work experience scheme work permit (TWES) for 
the year they spend as GP registrars. The NHS funds the GP registrar element of training. 
Holders of TWES are normally expected to return to their home country after training period, 
but the Home Office has agreed that those in GP training are not subject to the normal TWES 
restrictions. They can apply for GP posts in the UK after the training and apply for work 
permits or to remain in the UK through the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme. Doctors need 
to have full registration when undertaking GP registrar posts. After training they can apply 
for salaried jobs for which a work permit is needed. GP principals can apply to remain in the 
UK through the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme. 
Most foreign doctors come to the UK initially for training. The representation of 
foreign doctors in various training grades in England is presented in Table 3. Note, however,   13
that overseas doctors account for the largest share of the workforce in staff grade posts, which 
do not lead to further certificates or provide specialist training. They are also well represented 
in associate specialist posts. In such cases formal training has finished but the post-holders 
have not been able to find consultant posts. This is interesting as the declared aim of most 
doctors, as well as of the training schemes, is to obtain postgraduate training in the UK. 
Among those in training towards GP qualification in England there were only 172 
overseas trainees among 1446 registrars (12%) in 1998. Because the funding system has 
changed recently, this number is expected to increase in the future. 
 
Evidence of Screening 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Initial screening of overseas doctors entering the United Kingdom takes place through the 
conditions for registration. Taking the PLAB test incurs costs, as part of it is taken in the 
United Kingdom. The test consists of two parts, the first of which can be taken in several 
locations (including India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nigeria), but the second part (the OSCE, 
Observed Structured Clinical Examination) can only be taken in Britain. The fees for the two 
exams are £145 and £430 respectively. The average pass rate is 59% for the first part and for 
part two it is 84%. There is, however, no pre-set pass rate. The PLAB is a qualification, not a 
part of NHS manpower planning; passing the PLAB does not guarantee employment. 
(MacDonald 2001.) 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that getting a training post is not straightforward 
even after passing the PLAB test: in 1998 one district general hospital had 147 applications 
for four SHO posts, and only four of the applications were from British nationals, two of 
whom were UK graduates (Sridhar 1998). In 2000 another SHO post attracted 224 applicants 
of whom 216 were non-EEA graduates (Sridhar 2000). The extent of competition for posts is 
also largely dependent on the specialty. 
A scheme for training placements – the Overseas Doctors Training Scheme (ODTS) – 
was established in 1984 and is a dual sponsorship scheme run by the Royal Colleges and the 
Department of Health. Initially, the scheme was run by individuals, where a senior colleague 
from overseas arranged a training post with a consultant in Britain. Currently, overseas 
doctors apply for the scheme directly to the relevant college. Some colleges are not running 
the double sponsorship scheme anymore but sponsor overseas doctors independently of the 
Department of Health through their own placement schemes. Selection is made on the basis 
recommendations and candidates’ experience, but exact requirements vary by college.   14
Currently all colleges require at least two years experience in the specialty they wish to 
practice in, as well as a primary qualification that is acceptable for GMC limited registration. 
The applicants must not have failed the PLAB. (Constable et al 2002.) 
Once accepted to the training scheme, the college acts as the applicant’s UK sponsor 
and the applicant is put onto a waiting list; obtaining a post can take as long as two to three 
years. Trainees are placed in their first post without formal interview, but for any subsequent 
posts they have to apply through normal procedures (Gupta & Lingam 1999). Direct 
placement has caused concern because it reduces the number of posts that are available 
thorough open competition (Welsh 2000). In addition to ODTS, the British Council has its 
own sponsorship scheme which is aimed at doctors with at least three years experience in 
their specialty. This sponsorship scheme also attracts a large number of applications 
(Constable et al. 2002). 
Returning to the home country 
 
The aim of permit free training as well as of the training schemes is that overseas doctors 
return to their home country after their training. Staying on in the UK after the training, 
however, is relatively common. Currently as many as 60-70% of doctors stay after their 
training period, although the BMA has expressed a view that this is due to training being 
inadequate, rather than doctors’ reluctance to return to their home country (Davis 2000). 




4.  The data 
 
The data for the current study were collected through interviews and through a postal survey 
for those who were not reached by telephone or had not provided a telephone number. The 
total number of responses was 137, 104 of which were the result of interviews and 33 from 
the postal survey. The questionnaire was originally designed for telephone interviews and 
thus the responses to the postal survey are more likely to have errors due to misunderstanding 
of questions
7. 
                                                                 
7 The questionnaire has been included as an appendix.   15
Our sample was obtained from a web-based survey of doctors conducted by the Open 
University
8. Some of the individuals responding to this survey provided their contact details 
and volunteered to participate our study. This survey also covered UK doctors, and in the 
initial stage the information on the country of origin was separated from the contact details. 
Those contacted were chosen on the basis of their foreign sounding names (a small sample of 
English names were also checked to justify this approach). Later it became possible to 
separate EEA and non-EEA doctors’ contact details. We contacted every non-EEA doctor we 
could identify through these means. The total number of phone numbers provided was 476
9 
and there were also 28 contact addresses without phone numbers.  
There are at least three sources of sampling error in our sample among UK-based 
doctors: the participants of the original study may be a selected sample of those from 
overseas and there is further selection at the stage of volunteering to participate in our survey. 
Without information about the whole population we cannot infer exactly how these samples 
are biased. Thirdly, the sample represents only those individuals who have migrated to the 
UK, and is by no means representative of all doctors in the sending countries.  
It is also possible that there were misunderstandings or misinterpretations regarding 
the questions. Pre-testing did not reveal any major sources of response errors, but particularly 
the postal survey questionnaires were often incompletely filled, and it is possible that some 
questions that were answered were not interpreted in the correct way. The response rate in the 
postal survey was 50.8%. 
 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1  Descriptive statistics 
 
The countries represented in the sample are presented in table 3. The main sending country is 
India, followed by Nigeria and South Africa. Most (75%) of the immigrant doctors have full 
GMC registration, and the most common route of entry is PLAB (35%), the next most 
important route being ODTS (21%). The rest either had an EEA degree, had a direct 
placement or were exempted from the PLAB because their medical degree was recognised. 
                                                                 
8 We would like to thank Prof. Janet Grant from the OU and her team for collecting the list of contacts.   
9 Including ‘British’ names. The total number of ‘foreign’ contact numbers was 195.    16
Table 4 displays the means of the main demographic variables in the sample by the 
income group of the country of origin defined by the World Bank (low income, middle 
income, high income). We have also separated out Indians into their own g roup (India 
belongs to the low-income group in the above classification). Individuals from low-income 
countries are more typically male and married and they have more frequently dependents. 
This may be due to the fact that they are also older than doctors from more developed 
countries. Doctors from middle-income countries more frequently had spouses who were 
from the UK, whereas for Indian doctors this is very rare. This may indicate different reasons 
for migrating to the UK (or for staying there). Also the length of experience in home country 
seems to differ across groups: Indians and doctors from low- income countries have worked 
for longer periods in their home countries than middle or high-income country doctors. Many 
high-income countries in this sample are EEA countries, which, given their considerably 
easier entry to the UK, is not surprising. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest that the country of origin, or perhaps more 
strictly the conditions there, may have some impact on how migrants who enter the United 
Kingdom are selected
10. Possibly either motives to migrate or influence of the screening 
mechanisms differ across countries. Clearly these motives or incentives to migrate are linked 
to the conditions in the sending country compared to those in the UK, as well as individual 
career plans and preferences. In the following section we look at more closely the decisions 
to migrate and how these relate to the characteristics of countries and individuals.  
 
5.2  Incentives 
 
In virtually all economic theory migration decisions are based on the incentives to migrate, 
the benefit from migration (interpreted broadly to include current and future income, working 
conditions, security etc.) and opportunity cost thereof. The crucial assumption in models of 
beneficial brain drain is that the expected benefit from migrating is higher for more educated 
individuals in developing countries, either because net benefit is higher or because the 
probability of migration is higher. In the following we examine some aspects of incentives to 
migrate drawing from our data and other available information. We explore information on 
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salaries, facilities, reported motives to migrate and how these relate to each other and to the 
other characteristics of the migrants. 
A major issue is naturally the salary differential between home and host countries. In 
addition to our own survey (which also included questions on relative salaries) we have some 
official information about doctors’ salaries in the UK and India. NHS salaries are based on 
scales published by the Department of Health. The approximate upper and lower limits of 
Indian salaries were provided by Dr. Rajesh Chanda. In table 5 we have presented Indian and 
UK salaries based on these sources. The Indian salaries have been converted into sterling by 
using the current exchange rate (£1=Rs 76.6).  
The UK salaries are considerably higher in nominal terms, with basic salaries 6 to 10 
times higher and substantial supplements in addition. When we take price levels into account, 
however, the differences in salaries narrow considerably. According to the World Bank 
purchasing power parity conversion factors (2000), prices in India are 5.3 times lower on 
average than in the UK. Such price level comparisons are rather rough as there are likely to 
be significant regional differences within large countries, differences in quality of goods and 
services within countries and questions about the appropriateness of the common 
consumption basket, especially given that in many cases a high proportion of income is saved 
(in financial assets) or remitted home as cash payments. Nonetheless while they are not large 
enough compensate for the salary differential completely, they suggest that the pecuniary 
incentives for India-UK migration are not overwhelming.  
This is also the picture emerging from our survey (Table 6). Interviewees were first 
asked what percentage of their current salary would they be receiving in their home country if 
they had stayed at home and had a ‘normal’ career. Another question concerned the salary 
they would be earning if they were working in the current grade in their home country. Given 
that many of the overseas doctors had experienced a reduction in grade or some other change 
in career upon arrival in the UK, these two could be expected to differ in many cases. Many 
respondents would not state an exact figure, but were able to indicate the direction of the 
difference. They were specifically asked to answer the question in monetary terms, without 
correcting for the price level (although it is possible that some of them despite this answered 
the question in real terms). Applying the correction for the price level to our figures changes 
the picture, the Indians’ own estimates of their salary in India would give considerable higher 
real incomes at home than in the UK. This could, of course, reflect a selection bias in 
migration whereby migrants are on average better than stayers. We return to these screening 
issues below.   18
It also has to be noted that if the money earned in the UK is spent in the sending 
country (after the spell of migration or through remittances), differences in the monetary 
value of salaries are the relevant variable. Given the importance of remittances, see below, 
and the occasional comments by respondents about working in Britain to boost savings or pay 
off debts, this could be an important consideration. Overall, therefore, we conclude that 
financial considerations are likely to play at least a certain role in the relocation of doctors to 
the United Kingdom. 
We also a sked the individuals about their motives to migrate. Table 7 gives 
information regarding the motives for migration by country group. Financial advantages were 
clearly a more common reason for individuals from low and middle-income countries 
suggesting again that there are positive salary differentials. Most commonly in each group, 
however, doctors stated advancing their career as a reason to migrate to the UK, although 
‘Advancing my career’ can, of course, include financial considerations as well. Personal 
reasons were slightly more frequent for the doctors from the high-income countries, which 
may mean that they are selected on the basis of personal preferences (for example an 
enthusiasm to travel and live abroad, or marital arrangements, reasons which often came up 
in the interviews) rather than financial incentives, abilities or professional qualities. On the 
basis of the salary information presented above high-income country migrants also gain 
considerably smaller financial advantages from moving to the UK, and they also mention this 
less often as a motive. 
Career concerns are obviously of major importance as motives. Table 8 gives more 
details on the variables relating to migrant doctors’ career progress. Almost half of the 
overseas doctors (45%) had experienced a reduction in their grades at migration (this includes 
those who had to do a clinical attachment upon arrival). Only 10% had experienced 
unemployment in their home country, but 27% had had spells of unemployment in the UK. 
Individuals from India had the highest incidence of spells of unemployment in both the UK 
and their home country, and they also had experienced a reduction in grade most often 
(63%)
11. Only 4% of doctors from the low-income countries had experienced unemployment 
in their home countries, but as many as 30% had been unemployed in the UK. Doctors from 
middle-income countries had the lowest incidence of unemployment in both the UK and 
abroad. For high-income country doctors’ unemployment spells in the UK were rarer than for 
those from low-income countries. These data could be interpreted to mean that even given the 
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higher possibility of unemployment migration still provides returns to low-income country 
doctors, as the difference in salaries is much larger, or that training in the UK is relatively 
more useful for their future career. It also seems unlikely that a large proportion of migrant 
doctors are leaving their home countries because of unemployment, as they face 
unemployment in the UK much more often than in their home countries. Given that one of 
the arguments against brain drain is the shortage of doctors that it causes in sending countries, 
it is, however, significant that as many as 19% of the major migrant group, Indian doctors, 
had actually been unemployed in India at some stage of their career. 
It is of interest to know whether migration incentives mainly arise from the 
individual’s characteristics or the characteristics of the sending country. The question on 
reasons for migration does not directly address this, but other questions shed light on 
conditions in the sending country like facilities or the possibility of finding a training post. 
On the whole most respondents (76.7%) said that the facilities they had before coming to the 
UK had been good or very good. A majority (58.5%), however, reckoned that it is difficult or 
very difficult to find a decent medical training post in their home country. This suggests that 
career concerns may be more important incentive than the lack of facilities in home country. 
It also again hints at a  selection bias in migration: facilities in low income countries are not 
generally good or very good by UK standards, so the fact that migrants commonly had them 
suggest that they were favoured (although some of the respondents may have been 
responding the question in terms of the level of facilities relative to the average in their own 
country). Similarly, migration probably selects those most interested in training and 
advancement, characteristics which are often informally associated with productivity and 
value as an employee. 
Overall, financial advantages and career concerns seem to be the main motive for 
migration but their importance varies across countries. 
  
5.3  Return intentions 
 
In the context of the brain drain the propensity to return is of major importance. Returning 
migrants potentially bring human capital, networks and technology with them, and the 
temporary nature of migration can transform the brain drain into a highly beneficial ‘brain 
circulation’. We cannot measure return directly but did survey respondents’ return intentions 
which probably has some correlation with actual returns. Moreover, whether or not   20
individuals plan to stay in the target country all their working life is also likely to influence 
their career decisions and remittances. 
In our sample 26% of respondents reported that they do not intend to return, 41% do, 
and 32% are uncertain. The main difference between the income groups is that in the high-
income group fewer doctors intended to return: 50% of low-income country doctors (and 
46% of Indians) intended to return, whereas this holds for only 17% of high-income country 
doctors. The percentage of those who were uncertain varies between 29% – 36%. In part the 
differences between groups may reflect the fact that high-income country doctors often have 
unrestricted rights to stay in the UK because they are EEA citizens. 
The reasons mentioned for returning by the respondents are presented in table 9
12. 
Most commonly they cited family reasons, duty to serve the home country or because they do 
not want to settle in the UK. The high-income country doctors typically mention reasons 
different from other groups, but the number respondents in this group who intended to return 
is very small. The most common reasons for not returning are working conditions, facilities 
and the standard of living
13. The Indian, low-income and middle-income doctors mention 
better working conditions and facilities more often, whereas working relationships and family 
reasons are often cited by the high-income doctors. As expected, the standard of living is 
mentioned most often by the low-income country doctors. 
In many developing countries the quality of facilities provided by the public and 
private sectors differs a lot, as it does between rural and urban sectors. The private sector also 
typically provides possibilities for higher salaries, at least for senior doctors, as illustrated by 
the Indian salary figures presented above. We asked the respondents who intended to return 
to their home country whether they i ntend to work in the public or private sector i) 
immediately after their return and ii) five years after their return. Of those who intended to 
return, the majority intend to work in the private sector after their return (immediately after 
return 55.4%, five years after return 64.8%
14), and a huge majority (89.3%) intend to work in 
an urban area
15. The percentage of Indian doctors who intend to work in the private sector 
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be relevant for return decision, or to unclear postal questionnaire responses. Some individuals had also filled in the 
postal questionnaires to state reasons for not returning although they had initially said that they do not know if they 
intend to return; these are not reported above.  
 
14 These figures include some respondents who say they will work in both public and private sector, without them 
the figures are 48.2% and 55.6% respectively. 
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after their return immediately is 76.9% and in five years time similarly 76.9%
16. These 
figures suggest that migration and return decisions are driven by career concerns. The 
sectoral issues will be discussed in more detail in later sections. 
The overall conclusion from these figures is that by no means all developing country 
doctors come to the UK to stay. Despite the salary differentials and better facilities a fair 
number of them intend to return. The returnees, however, are not very likely to work in 
impoverished rural areas. It is possible, however, that although the returning doctors 
themselves work in urban areas, they “push” incumbent doctors out into the rural labour 
market. 
 
5.4    Screening 
 
As pointed out in the theoretical discussion, whether or not migrants are effectively screened, 
is of major importance for the implications of the beneficial brain drain hypothesis. Several 
questions in the questionnaire attempt to assess the quality of the migrants, for example those 
regarding the class of the degree, the institution where it was obtained (at least in those 
countries where applicants choose the university they apply to), salary etc. However, most of 
these can reflect the degree of screening adequately only if the individual characteristics and 
the sample statistics can be compared with those from the population that remains in the 
sending country. In our case this is not possible, with some exceptions that are discussed 
towards the end of this section. Thus we have to construct measures of screening either by 
using individuals’ own assessments of their qualities compared to those of doctors in general 
in their home country or by using information available from other sources to infer something 
about the population in general as we did in the discussion of Indian salaries above. The fact 
that our sample may be a selected sample of overseas doctors has to be taken into account 
when assessing the methods. Those who manage to migrate to the UK are already a selected 
sample, and the fact that sampling was based on voluntary participation is another source of 
selectivity. In the first method the subjectivity of the responses must also be considered as a 
shortcoming. 
The first test we conducted concerns the association between the respondents’ 
opinion on how difficult it was for his or her last employer at home to replace them. More 
specifically we want to see if doctors tend to think that replacing them is more difficult for 
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the employer than is finding suitably qualified applicants in general. If this were the case, we 
could interpret it as a sign that individuals in the UK sample think they are better than the 
home country average. However, there is a possibility that the opposite outcome (doctors 
think they can be replaced more easily than in general) is also a result of screening because 
the doctors who are good enough to migrate tend to hold posts that are generally considered 
as more desirable.  Where the doctors worked prior to migration also has implications for 
how easily they can be replaced: if migrant doctors are disproportionately from urban areas or 
private sectors they would probably be easier to replace. 
In Table 10 we have presented the frequencies of observations for each combination 
of responses. The total number of observations is for which there is a response for both 
question is 88, although if we consider only those whose last job before the UK was in their 
home country there are only 84 complete responses to both questions (for the purpose of the 
symmetry test these are, however, essentially the same, as the only difference is on the 
diagonal). 99 individuals responded the  question about replacement (29 had not been 
employed recently in their home country before coming to the UK and 7 said they 
nevertheless did not know how difficult it was for their last employer in home country to 
replace them), and 121 responded to the question about the difficulty of finding applicants. 
There was a minor mistake in the interviewing process and 3 respondents were not asked this 
question. Also several respondents (2 of whom had not recently worked in their home 
country) said they did not know what the situation was for employers in their home country. 
We conduct a test of the symmetry of this table by assuming that it is symmetric 
around the diagonal, and the calculating the expected frequencies for each off-diagonal cell 
( ) j i j i „ , ,  where i denotes row and j column. The actual frequencies can then be compared 
with the expected ones by calculating a Chi-squared statistic. However, given that it relies on 
squared differences between frequencies this test does not test directly whether the upper or 
lower triangle is higher.  
There are minimum conditions for applying the Chi-squared test, as the test is exact 
only when sample size goes to infinity, but these differ by author
17. By most accounts, 
however, our tests are, at best, on the very margin of acceptability: we can use only those 
cells for which the expected frequency is more than zero, so are five degrees of freedom;  the 
                                                                 
17 Wickens (1989), for example, has compiled the following list of minimum conditions:  
1.  For tests with one degree of freedom the expected frequency should exceed two or three. 
2.  With more degrees of freedom expected frequency of one in some cells is tolerable. 
3.  In large tables up to 20% of the cells can have expected frequency less than one. 
4.  The total sample should be at least four or five times the number of cells. 
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expected frequencies in two pairs of cells are less than one, which accounts for 40% of cells; 
the total sample used in this test was only 31. As noted below the table, the hypothesis of 
symmetry cannot be rejected on the basis of the chi squared test (probability, p=0.24). 
We also tested the probability of a certain number of observations lying above and 
below the diagonal (proportion test). Since we are not interested in precisely where in the 
upper or lower triangles the observations lie we take the number of off-diagonal observations 
(31) as given and test the null hypothesis that the probability of any observation falling above 
the diagonal is 0.5. The probability of 14 or fewer observations below (or 17 or more above) 
in this case is 36%, so again we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Another test of screening concerns the difficulties of finding a job in the UK (table 
11). If respondents consider that finding a job in the UK was easier for them than for doctors 
from their country in general, this could be regarded as a sign of screening (presuming that 
their assessments are correct). There is, however, a question of how respondents interpreted  
‘difficulty to find a job’: it is also dependent on luck, and thus naturally those who have 
indeed found jobs have been luckier than those who have not (and have not been observed). 
Again we tested the symmetry of the table and this time Chi-squared indeed confirms 
that it is unlikely that the table is asymmetric by of pure chance (p=0.0002). In this case there 
is only one pair of cells for which the expected frequency is below one. Also the total number 
of observations  is five times more than the number of cells included in the test. The 
requirements for chi squared test are thus more fully satisfied. The proportion test using 
binomial distribution  shows that the allocation of observations below and above is also very 
unlikely to be random in this case (p=0.000097). 
Similarly, respondents’ assessments of the difficulty of finding placements (in ODTS 
or direct placement programme) in their personal experience or in general (table 12) could 
reflect the efficiency of screening, as selection to these programmes is another main channel 
(in addition to PLAB) for overseas doctors to enter the UK.  The cross-tabulation seems 
asymmetric, but the chi-squared suggests that there is no conclusive evidence of responses to 
the two questions to be systematically asymmetric (p=0.107). The number of individuals 
coming to the UK through these schemes in our sample is, however, relatively small, and the 
chi-squared test is unlikely to be applicable in this case. The test based on binomial 
distribution, on the other hand, strongly rejects the hypothesis of symmetry, suggesting that 
migrants found it easier to find placements themselves than they believed general conditions 
at home would warrant.   24
The respondents were asked about the institute from which they obtained their degree. 
The number of observations from most countries is too small to draw any conclusions but the 
number of Indian doctors in the sample is 58, which should be adequate to check whether 
migrants have a typical profile across institutes. The Indian system also allows students to 
choose the university they apply to, so the question of ‘good’ universities is relevant. There 
are no official rankings of Indian universities, but since 1998 India Today magazine has 
published listings of 10 (in 1998 five) top medical colleges. According to our estimate (in 
some cases there was some uncertainty over which college the respondent had gone to, 
although they mentioned the university) 15 out of 58 (26%) of the Indian respondents had 
obtained their qualification from the colleges mentioned in the four ranking lists available. 
The share of these colleges out of total admissions is (in 2002) 1840 out of 20777. If we 
assume that the respondents are randomly selected the probability that 15 or more individuals 
in the sample of 58 would be from these colleges is 0.01%, the expected value being five. 
A problem associated with the test above is that those coming from the top 
universities are in general older and have more experience in India before coming to the UK. 
Given the fact that medical education in India has expanded considerably during the last 
decades and that a large part of that increase has been due to new private institutions 
(Jayaram 1995), it is possible that the top universities accounted for a much larger proportion 
of medical graduates in the past. The test above would thus give too small a probability for 
the observed share of graduates from those schools. We have no detailed information about 
the exact number of graduates from different colleges over time. However, the number of 
doctors in India increased by 82% between 1986 and 2001 (Medical Council of India). 
We also wanted to see if having obtained a degree in one of the top universities is 
related to the grade the individual has attained before coming to the UK. Without controlling 
for experience, there seem to be more consultants among those who graduated from the top 
universities – with a chi-squared statistic significant at 1% level (p=0.01). However, those 
who come from top universities also had more experience on average (7.6 years as opposed 
to 4.9) before coming to the UK. Due to a very small sample, it is not possible to examine 
association separately between grade and university for each level of experience. Instead, we 
estimate an ordered probit model for grade attained (before coming to the UK). This is done 
for Indian doctors only, excluding those whose grade is ‘other’. In addition to experience we 
used gender, grade of degree, age and years worked in the private sector as explanatory 
variables – see Appendix 2. The coefficient of top university attendance is in fact negative in 
this relationship, but not at all significant (p=0.788). This was the case also for models with   25
fewer explanatory variables. Thus the relationship between grade and top university 
attendance seems largely due to the factors that explain grade (viz. years of experience) being 
correlated with having attended a top university. Nonetheless, the fact that doctors from the 
best institutions are over-represented among migrants remains indicative of screening. 
We have also conducted a test regarding the association between difficulties of 
finding a decent training post and the level of facilities before coming to the UK (table 13). If 
the individuals sampled are selected from good institutions, it is likely that even when they 
come from countries where facilities are generally poor, migrating doctors will come from 
institutions with good facilities. However, as we do not have information on the level of 
facilities in general (but only of those who migrate) we cannot test whether there is 
significant difference or not. 
There is negative association, as expected, between the difficulty of finding a medical 
training post and level of facilities. Correlation coefficients for ordinal variables like Kruskal 
and Goodman’s gamma (-0.1588 in this case) and Kendall’s tau (-0.1060) are negative. The 
asymptotic standard errors of these correlation coefficients, however, are so high (0.148 and 
0.099, respectively) that they are not significantly different from zero. The chi-squared on the 
contingency table in Table 13, on the other hand, shows that the variables are not independent 
(p=0.001).
18 
We also wanted to see if, after controlling for country specific variables, those 
individuals who had good facilities were somehow “better”
19. We explained the quality of 
facilities at home by an ordered probit model with several country variables – income group, 
difficulty to find a decent training post, general difficulty to find qualified applicants. We 
then calculated the predicted level of facilities due to these country variables and interpreted 
the residual over- or under-performance as dependent on individual doctor’s skills. Finally 
we checked whether this residual had any association with the other measures of ability of a 
doctor. The only significant (at 5% level) association was with the dummy indicating whether 
migration possibilities had influenced the choice of specialty: those who faced worse 
facilities than predicted seemed to admit more often that their choice of specialty had been 
affected by the prospect of migration (the reverse seems to hold for those who had unusually 
good facilities). There was no association with grade, unemployment, gender, route of entry, 
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having an excellent degree or having attended a top university. This outcome appears to 
suggest that access to good facilities offer us very little information about doctors’ individual 
abilities, but that those who intend to train in their specialty abroad, are not concerned about 
the bad level of facilities in their home country. 
Considering the above tests, it is also of interest to see if respondents’ assessments of 
the general difficulty of finding a job or a decent medical training post are consistent for each 
country. India is the only country for which we have large enough number of observations to 
make sensible comparisons. The results show that 71% of the sample thinks it is difficult or 
very difficult to find a decent medical training post, 85.7% think it is easy or very easy for 
employers to find applicants and 82.7% thinks it is difficult or very difficult for Indians to 
find a job in the UK. These figures, especially the last two, show a high degree of 
consistency, which suggests a fair degree of reliability. 
Given that the screening mechanism involves an official component which is aimed at 
selecting high quality doctors, it is of interest to see if this official mechanism measures 
qualities that are similar to those used in screening inside home countries. The two main 
routes for overseas (non-EEA) doctors are the PLAB test and Overseas Doctors Training 
Scheme (or other direct placement schemes), as described above. 
We looked at relationship between how may times an applicant had attempted the 
PLAB and his or her grade and class of medical degree, and between how difficult it was for 
the applicant to find a post in the UK and his or her grade before coming to the UK and class 
of degree. There was no significant association in any of these tests. It is, of course, still 
possible that migrant doctors are different from those who are left behind. Screening in the 
UK, however, does not seem to have one-to-one relationship with observable measures of 
success in migrants’ home countries. It has to be noted though, that very senior doctors can 
be exempted from PLAB on the basis of their experience, and thus the most successful 
doctors who have already obtained postgraduate training would not face the choice of route. 
The number of such doctors in our sample is relatively small, however
20. 
PLAB and ODTS are different methods of screening individuals and it would be 
interesting to see if success in them is related to the measures of individual’s ability. We 
compared the percentage of individuals choosing either r oute among Indian doctors by 
splitting the sample by the university status. We excluded the individuals who had used other 
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routes. It seems that ODTS is indeed more common among individuals from top universities, 
but the chi-squared test indicates that this is not significant (p=0.331). If we only include 
those whose had more than six years of experience (and who then could have realistically 
used the ODTS route), the relationship is nearly but not quite significant (p=0.112), but the 
number of observations is also very small (21). Estimating a probit model on whether or not 
the individual had chosen ODTS (Indian doctors) showed that having SpR, consultant or 
“other” grade status increases significantly the probability of entering thorough ODTS route. 
The other explanatory variables (top university, excellent degree, experience before entry to 
the UK, entry cohort) did not have significant effects. This may reflect the ability of ODTS to 
identify ‘high-fliers’ independently of the ‘objective’ measures of ability that we can identify. 
When we estimated the same probit model for the whole sample of those who had 
entered through PLAB and ODTS, SpR and other grades had positive and significant effect 
on choosing ODTS (consultant grade predicted ODTS perfectly and  was dropped), and 
having an excellent degree also had a positive coefficient that was almost significant at 10% 
level (p=0.104). India as a source country had negative but not statistically significant 
coefficient. Having attended an Indian top university had positive but not significant effect. 
Thus, there seems to be some relation between the ability of a doctor (or at least his or her 
subsequent success) and choosing ODTS. 
As mentioned above, investigating the selection of migrants fully would actually 
require knowledge of the characteristics of the total population of doctors in the sending 
country. It is likely that if we had this information we could for example infer something on 
the basis of which sector the respondents had worked prior to entering the UK. A very high 
percentage (86.6%) of respondents had last worked in an urban area in their home country
21. 
33.9% had worked in the private sector just before they left
22. 36.8% of Indian doctors had 
worked in the private sector before coming to the UK. In high and middle-income countries a 
smaller fraction of doctors (25%) than in low income countries (39.1%) had worked in 
private sector just before coming to the UK (given that they had actually worked in their 
home country immediately before the UK)
23. 
Despite the shortcomings of the data there is some evidence of screening of migrants. 
The respondents clearly feel that they were more successful in finding jobs in the UK than 
doctors from their home countries in general. A disproportionately large number of the Indian 
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23 Excluding those who worked in both sectors the figures are 25%, 10% and 34.8%.   28
doctors in the sample have obtained their degrees from elite institutions. The Overseas 
Doctors’ Training Scheme seems to select consistently more able or successful doctors. With 
a high level of certainty we can conclude that there is positive correlation between the quality 
of a doctor and his or her possibilities of getting through both the official screening system 
and finding a job in the UK. In addition we have already noted the smaller UK–India salary 
differential among migrants than in general, the costs of PLAB and the high demand for posts 
in the UK among overseas doctors. All this amounts to pretty clear evidence that potential 
medical migrants to the UK are effectively screened, and thus that the influence of the 
possibility of migration on educational decisions is not the same for all levels of ability 
(assuming that individuals are rational and have correct information on their ability and 
opportunities). In the next section we look more closely at the educational responses to 
migration possibilities. 
 
5.5   The educational response to migration 
 
A crucial point in the theory of beneficial brain drain is the assumption that the possibility of 
migration influences decisions on education. We investigated this issue by asking a 
straightforward question on whether the possibility of migration had influenced the 
respondent’s decisions. It is of course possible that the respondents do not answer the 
question honestly: especially in countries where brain drain is considered as a major problem, 
it may be regarded as ‘immoral’ to plan migration when taking up state-funded education. 
We also asked, therefore, if the respondents thought that doctors in general in their country 
were thinking of the possibility of migration when making certain decisions. This question 
might give more reliable answers to whether the respondent him or herself had taken the 
possibility of migration into account. 
In table 14 we have presented the averages of responses to the question whether the 
individual had considered migration when making certain decisions, and whether they believe 
others in their country do so in general. 
There were some missing observations, almost all of which were due to the 
respondent saying that they do not know what the doctors in their country think in general. 
For postal questionnaires there were two unclear responses for questions regarding personal 
decisions. For the sake of comparability the averages here were calculated for those who had 
answered on all the possibilities offered in the questions.   29
An interesting observation is that for individuals from high income countries larger 
(or roughly the same) percentages of respondents said that the possibility of migration had 
had an influence on their own decisions as said the same for doctors in general. In the other 
country groups the opposite is typically the case. This could suggest that migrants from high-
income countries are people for whom migrating is a goal itself and that in those countries the 
general incentives to migrate are weak. 
We also created a union variable indicating if the respondent answered ‘yes’ to any of 
these ‘influence’ questions. We then compared this variable with certain characteristics. 
There is no association between income group and admitting to thinking of migrating, nor 
between the size of the country and thinking of migrating. The above observation of the 
differences between the country groups by income is, however, also true for the union 
variable. 
We can also examine the relationship between migration intentions and the 
characteristics of the individuals. There was no association between migration having an 
impact on their decisions and any of the explicit reasons to migrate considered in table 15. 
Neither was there any association between the grade held before coming to the UK or class of 
the degree and the impact of migration on decisions. For the sub-sample of Indian doctors we 
also cross-tabulated the university status (top ten university or not) and whether or not the 
possibility of migration had influenced migrant’s decisions. Those who went to the Indian top 
universities admitted less often that the possibility of migration was influential. The chi-
squared test, however, indicated that this was not significant (p=0.225). There was no 
association between sending remittances and return intentions and having considered 
migration when making decisions. There seems, however, to be some association between the 
difficulty of getting a decent training post and migration having influence on decisions (Table 
16). If the doctors are aware of this difficulty before taking decisions it is natural that they 
might consider migrating and also take this into account when making the decisions. 
Clearly it is not true that potential migrants never consider migration when making 
decisions on education and career. Equally clear, however, is that not all do so – either for 
intrinsic reasons or perhaps because they believe that screening would preclude their gaining 
from such possibility. (Of course, in our sample of migrants, such a belief would be false.) 
The critical issue is whether the pro-education effect is large enough to cause the total effect 
of the brain drain to be beneficial. The following simple calculation considers how large an 
effect of migration on education decisions would be required to produce a beneficial brain 
drain, and how large a degree of screening would influence this.   30
Suppose there were no screening and that migrants are randomly drawn from the 
population of doctors. Suppose that 40% of doctors are ‘influenced’ to train in medicine by 
migration – about what we observe – and that this means that in the absence of migration 
there would be 40% fewer doctors. Suppose the actual migration rate is 20% as for India, so 
that of each 100 doctors trained, 80 remain at home. The net benefit is thus (80b – 100c) 
where b is benefit and c is cost of training doctors. Without migration net benefit is 60(b – c), 
so the net gain from migration is thus (20b –40c), which is positive if b>2c. 
If we now relax the assumptions, and reduce the ‘influence rate’ to 10%, migration 
will inevitably lead to losses. Similarly, if the migration rate is 40% (or more) migration, 
even with a 40% influence effect losses will result. For small countries it is quite realistic to 
assume this rate of migration among highly educated individuals (see, for example, 
Carrington and Detragiache 1998). Also, the ‘influence rate’ obtained from our survey is not 
strictly speaking the proportion of individuals who would have not trained as doctors in the 
absence of migration, but only those who reported that migration possibilities had had some 
influence on their decisions. Even if the ‘real influence rate’ were half of this, 20%, migration 
would result in losses for the sending country. 
If we take into account screening, the picture becomes much less positive for the 
possibility of beneficial brain drain. Even though among actual migrants the ‘influence rate’ 
is 40%, a much smaller percentage of those who remained at home seem likely to have 
chosen to educate themselves due to the possibility of migration. If we assume that the 
influence rate among ‘stayers’ is 10% and among migrants 40%, the total number of doctors 
in the absence of migration in the above scenario is 84. The net benefit of migration in this 
case is inevitably negative. 
Given the figures we have found in our survey, this example suggests that the 
education channel for the beneficial effects of brain drain is not particularly plausible. 
However, when assessing whether the brain drain is indeed costly for the sending country, we 
also have to take into account other issues like the duration of migration and return migration. 
These are discussed in the next section. 
 
5.6  Other issues 
 
As far as the costs and benefits of the brain drain are concerned, the means of financing 
education, the flows of remittances and the sector in which the individuals would work if they 
returned (or the sector they left), are all interesting. We asked respondents to report the main   31
sources of their funding (those that accounted more than 25% of the total cost) of their 
education (table 16). Most doctors had used private means to finance their education, and a 
high percentage had also received free or highly subsidised education
24. In the middle income 
countries the respondents had less often received free education, and they also had got 
scholarships and borrowed money more often than the other groups. Clearly there would be 
some degree of lost public investments for the sending countries if all these doctors stayed 
abroad. 
Remittances can be a considerable source of income for developing countries. 45% of 
the individuals interviewed send remittances to their home country. These remittances were 
on average 16% of their income in the UK the lowest level of remittances 8% being i n 
middle-income countries, and the highest, 22%, in low-income countries (not all individuals 
gave precise percentage, and this figure might be overstated as those sending very small or 
irregular payments are not included). For low and high-income countries the percentage of 
income that remittances account for is higher than for middle-income countries. The purpose 
of the remittances is most typically supporting relatives and saving. There are considerable 
differences between individuals from different country groups: saving is the most common 
motivation for remittances in high-income countries but in low-income countries supporting 
relatives is much more important (Table 17). Those who intend to return send remittances 
more often, and among those who reported the percentage that remittances are of their 
income, they were also higher for individuals who intend to return to their home country. 
As the thickness of the labour market may have important implications for the costs of 
the brain drain, we have also studied the connection between country size and certain 
variables. The sample was split into two by defining population over 20 million as ‘large’ 
(definitions based on 10 and 15 million produced too small number of individuals from 
‘small’ countries for grouping to make any sense). A large majority of the migrants studied, 
however, come from large countries (119), and comparison of large and small countries did 
not reveal any remarkable differences in demographic characteristics or careers of the 
doctors. On the basis of the small number of individuals from small countries, it seems that 
they thought it was not more difficult for their employers in their home countries to replace 
them, nor was it more difficult for employers to find suitably qualified applicants. None of 
them had experienced unemployment in their home country whereas 12% of those from large 
                                                                 
24 Only completely free education was given as an option in the questionnaire, but as it emerged during the 
interviews that many had paid nominal tuition fees, highly subsidised education was also included in that option. 
The responses to postal questionnaires can be different in this respect.    32
countries had, so this may provide some support for the assumption that losses of skilled 
labour are more likely to be  harmful for small countries. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
We have investigated overseas doctors in the UK to discover the effects of the migration of 
high-level health personnel on the sending country. Theory shows that the extent to which the 
possibility of migration affects individuals’ education decisions, and how carefully migrants 
are screened are of paramount importance for the implications of migration. 
Our results suggest only relatively weak links between migration possibilities and 
training. Some respondents, but by no means all, admit that  the possibility of migration 
influenced their decisions. The conditions in the sending country clearly have an impact on 
the motivation and characteristics of migrants, and migration decisions are also obviously 
based on different motives in high- and low-income countries. There does not, however, seem 
to be an association between migration having influence on decisions and individual 
characteristics. 
There is also clear evidence of screening. In addition to the official mechanisms 
through which a doctor has to pass to gain the right to practice in the UK, our data suggest 
that the process of obtaining a job in the UK also serves as a considerable screening 
mechanism. For example, the doctors interviewed often reckoned that they had passed into 
the system more easily than average, and the Overseas Doctors’ Training Scheme seems to 
select consistently more able or successful doctors. A large number of the Indian doctors in 
the sample obtained their degrees from top institutions and they appear to have had smaller 
increases in their incomes as a result of migration than would be indicated by average pay 
ranges in India and Britain.  
Both pieces of evidence cast doubt on the possibility of large-scale benefits from the 
brain drain through its effects on education incentives. In other relevant dimensions, our data 
on overseas doctors in the UK show that a considerable number of them had received free or 
highly subsidised education. A large fraction, on the other hand, also sends remittances to 
their home country. Overall, therefore, it is still possible that the brain drain is beneficial 
through these other effects, although, so far, it is unclear what the total effect is. 




1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
United Kingdom  3568  3706  3620  3618  3687  3701  3845  3967  4030  4243  4304  4457 
EEA (excl. UK)  1315  1194  1190  1352  1490  1856  2144  2435  2022  1730  1512  1380 
Non-EEA  3110  3151  3671  3653  4043  3487  3978  4690  4238  3826  2857  2764 
 
Table 1. First time registrations. Source GMC 
 
  All  UK  EEA  Non-EEA  Share of 
Non-EEA 
All Grades  67838  46205  3662  17971  26.5% 
Consultant  24404  18991  1243  4170  17.1% 
Staff Grade  4803  1344  295  3164  65.9% 
Associate 
Specialist 
1552  544  50  958  61.7% 
Registrar 
Group 
12648  8093  875  3680  29.1% 
SHO  15384  9970  765  4649  30.2% 
House 
officer 
3685  3176  213  296  8.0% 
 
Table 2.  Percentage of hospital doctors by different countries of origin in England in 
September 2001. Source: NHS Workforce census.   34
 
COUNTRY  Freq.  Percent 
Armenia  1  0.73 
Australia  3  2.19 
Bangladesh  1  0.73 
Botswana  1  0.73 
Bulgaria  1  0.73 
Burma  2  1.46 
Colombia  1  0.73 
Egypt  2  1.46 
Germany  11  8.03 
Ghana  1  0.73 
Greece  2  1.46 
Guayana  1  0.73 
Holland  1  0.73 
Hungary  1  0.73 
India  58  42.34 
Iran  1  0.73 
Iraq  1  0.73 
Ireland  1  0.73 
Italy  1  0.73 
Kenya  1  0.73 
Malaysia  5  3.65 
Nepal  1  0.73 
Nigeria  10  7.3 
Pakistan  6  4.38 
Russia  1  0.73 
Singapore  2  1.46 
South Africa  9  6.57 
Spain  2  1.46 
Sudan  3  2.19 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
3  2.19 
Uganda  2  1.46 
Yugoslavia  1  0.73 
 
Table 3. Distribution of countries of origin in the sample   35
 
India  No. Obs.
a  Mean
b  Std. Dev. 
Woman  58  0.26  0.44 
Age  58  34.02  6.19 
Married  58  0.86  0.35 
Spouse from UK  50  0.06  0.24 
Spouse lives in UK  50  0.88  0.33 
Dependents  58  0.52  0.50 
Total experience in 
home country, years 
57  5.36  3.62 
Total experience in 
the UK, years 
57  4.06  3.82 
Low income       
Woman  28  0.18  0.39 
Age  28  34.89  6.11 
Married  28  0.82  0.39 
Spouse from UK  23  0.22  0.42 
Spouse lives in UK  23  0.96  0.21 
Dependents  27  0.67  0.48 
Total experience in 
home country, years 
28  3.79  3.55 
Total experience in 
the UK, years 
28  4.73  5.06 
Middle income       
Woman  28  0.36  0.49 
Age  28  33.14  4.57 
Married  28  0.64  0.49 
Spouse from UK  18  0.39  0.50 
Spouse lives in UK  18  1.00  0.00 
Dependents  28  0.50  0.51 
Total experience in 
home country, years 
26  3.00  2.43 
Total experience in 
the UK, years 
27  3.22  1.90 
High income       
Woman  23  0.52  0.51 
Age  23  33.87  4.70 
Married  23  0.39  0.50 
Spouse from UK  9  0.22  0.44 
Spouse lives in UK  9  1.00  0.00 
Dependents  23  0.26  0.45 
Total ex perience in 
home country, years 
22  1.93  2.48 
Total experience in 
the UK, years 
23  5.15  4.06 
 
Table 4. Means of the main demographic variables by country group 
                                                                 
a The questions on whether the spouse is from the UK and whether he/she lives there were only asked if the 
respondent was actually married. 
b For variables other than age or experience the mean equivalent to the proportion of respondents having the 
characteristic in question.    36
 
UK (NHS)  Level (UK 
grade) 










£23,190– £32,520  Up to 100%  £2,351 –£5,485    £2,351 –£4,702 
Middle 
level (SpR) 
£25,920 – £37,775  Up to 100% 
(Staff 
grade) 
£28,150 – £41,980   






£52,640 – £68,505  Discretionary 
points up to 
£21,960 or 
distinction 





£31,210 – £56,105 
 
Discretionary 
points up to 
£8,420 
£3,918 – £6,531  £3,265 – £7,837  £3,265 – £10,449 
 
Table 5. Salary scales in the UK and India   37
 




High income countries 
  No. obs.  Mean/Pro
portion 
No. obs.  Mean  No. obs.  Mean  No. obs.  Mean 
Salary as a 
proportion of 
current salary 




25  16  0.24  22  0.44  14  0.81 
Higher  56  0.09  23  0.00  24  0.00  22  0.18 
Lower  56  0.79  23  0.95  24  0.79  22  0.64 
Salary as a 
proportion of 
salary in the 
same grade in 
home country 
47  0.31  14  0.28  19  0.35  13  0.80 
Higher   53  0.00  21  0.00  23  0.00  20  0.25 
Lower  53  0.89  21  0.95  23  0.91  20  0.65 
 
Table 6. Relative salaries for sample doctors. 
                                                                 
25 This figure does not include two outliers who claimed that their salary in India would be ten times higher than in 
the UK. With the outliers the figure would be 0.81.    38
 
Reason for coming to the UK for training 
India  No. Obs.  Mean 
Advancing career  58  0.88 
Financial advantages  58  0.55 
Departmental connection  58  0.19 
Personal  58  0.40 
Other  58  0.21 
Low income     
Advancing career  28  0.89 
Financial advantages  28  0.35 
Departmental connection  28  0.07 
Personal  28  0.57 
Other  28  0.14 
Middle income     
Advancing career  28  0.86 
Financial advantages  28  0.43 
Departmental connection  28  0.12 
Personal  28  0.39 
Other  28  0.29 
High income     
Advancing career  23  0.74 
Financial advantages  23  0.17 
Departmental connection  23  0.17 
Personal  23  0.61 
Other  23  0.43 
 
Table 7. Summary of respondents’ reasons for coming to the UK for training   39
 
India  No. Obs  Mean 
Experienced unemployment in the UK  58  0.31 
Experienced unemployment in home 
country 
57  0.19 
Reduction in grade in the UK  58  0.63 
Low income     
Experienced unemployment in the UK  27  0.30 
Experienced unemployment in home 
country 
27  0.04 
Reduction in grade in the UK  28  0.39 
Middle income     
Experienced unemployment in the UK  28  0.18 
Experienced unemployment in home 
country 
28  0.00 
Reduction in grade in the UK  28  0.25 
High Income     
Experienced unemployment in the UK  23  0.22 
Experienced unemployment in home 
country 
23  0.09 
Reduction in grade in the UK  23  0.13 
 
Table 8. Unemployment and changes in grade.   40
 
  India  Low income  Middle income  High income 
Reasons for returning  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Mean  Mean  Obs  Mean 
Family reasons  26  0.81  14  0.79  12  0.83  4  0.25 
Duty to serve the home 
country 
26  0.77  14  0.71  12  0.75  4  0.00 
Lack of opportunities in 
the UK 
26  0.50  13  0.15  12  0.08  4  0.25 
Visa/res. Permit  26  0.31  13  0.23  12  0.17  4  0.00 
Do not want to settle in 
the UK 
26  0.62  14  0.86  12  0.58  4  0.50 
Career prospects at 
home 
25  0.32  14  0.57  12  0.25  4  0.00 
Better connections at 
home 
26  0.50  14  0.79  12  0.42  4  0.50 




India  Low income  Middle income  High income 
Reason for not 
returning 
Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean 
Want to gain more 
experience 
12  0.50  5  0.40  6  0.50  12  0.50 
Better working 
conditions 
12  0.75  5  0.80  6  0.83  12  0.42 
 
Better facilities  12  0.67  5  0.80  6  0.83  12  0.25 
UK health care system  12  0.42  5  0.80  6  0.67  12  0.42 
Better relationships with 
peers/managers 
12  0.50  5  0.40  6  0.50  12  0.58 
Better relationships with 
juniors 
12  0.42  5  0.40  6  0.50  12  0.67 
Family  12  0.75  6  0.83  6  0.83  12  0.92 
Standard of living  12  0.67  5  0.60  6  0.83  12  0.17 
Other  12  0.33  5  0.80  6  0.17  12  0.17 
 
Table 9. Summary of reported reasons to return to home country   41
 




Very Easy  Easy  Difficult  Very 
Difficult 
Total 
Very Easy  8  8  1  0  17 
Easy  2  36  7  0  45 
Difficult  0  8  10  1  19 
Very 
Difficult 
0  1  3  3  7 
Total  10  53  21  4  88 
 
2 c  for symmetry    6.67    Proportion test p=0.36 
Degrees of freedom   5 
Table 10. Respondents’ assessments of employers’ difficulties of replacing them and general 
difficulty to find applicants in their home country 
 
  How difficult to find a post in general   
How difficult 




Easy  Difficult  Very 
Difficult 
Total 
Very Easy  2  7  5  2  16 
Easy  2  22  22  7  53 
Difficult  1  2  22  8  33 
Very 
Difficult 
0  3  10  14  27 
Total  5  33  59  31  129 
 
2 c for symmetry   25.93    Proportional test p=0.000097 
Degrees of freedom    6 
Table 11. Respondents’ assessments of the difficulty of finding a post in the UK   42
 
  How difficult to find a placement (in general)   
How difficult 
to find a 
placement 
(personally) 
Very Easy  Easy  Difficult  Very 
Difficult 
Total 
Very Easy  1  2  0  0  3 
Easy  0  3  8  2  13 
Difficult  0  3  9  2  14 
Very Difficult  0  0  0  4  4 
Total  1  8  17  8  33 
 
   
2 c for symmetry     8.27273    Proportion test  p=0.006 
    Degrees of freedom    4 
Table 12. Respondents’ assessments of difficulty of finding a placement 
 
  Level of  facilities before coming to the UK 





Inadequate  Good  Very good  Total 
Very Easy  2  0  2  2  6 
Easy  0  7  16  12  35 
Difficult  0  8  27  6  41 
Very Difficult  1  5  10  4  20 
Total  3  20  55  24  102 
 
Chi squared    28.34 
Degrees of freedom  9 
Table 13. Assessments of difficulty to find a decent medical training post and level of 
facilities before coming to the UK   43
 
  India  Low income  Middle income  High Income 
Did the prospect of being able to work abroad affect your decisions 
To study 
medicine 
58  0.09  27  0.41  28  0.36  23  0.52 
Choice of 
university 
58  0.10  27  0.30  28  0.21  23  0.13 
Choice of 
specialty 
58  0.22  27  0.33  28  0.14  23  0.22 
Training 
abroad 
58  0.34  27  0.37  28  0.36  23  0.57 
Financing 
education 
58  0.21  27  0.11  28  0.21  23  0.17 
Effort put 
into studies 
58  0.28  27  0.37  28  0.29  23  0.22 
In your view, does the prospect of working abroad usually affect medical students’ or doctors’ decisions in 
your home country 
To study 
medicine 
56  0.21  26  0.46  27  0.33  19  0.16 
Choice of 
university 
56  0.23  26  0.30  27  0.41  19  0.11 
Choice of 
specialty 
56  0.43  26  0.50  27  0.33  19  0.26 
Training 
abroad 
56  0.54  26  0.62  27  0.63  19  0.47 
Financing 
education 
56  0.46  26  0.35  27  0.48  19  0.16 
Effort put 
into studies 
56  0.36  26  0.46  27  0.41  19  0.26 
 
Table 14. The influence of the possibility of migration on respondents’ decisions.  
 
How difficult to find a decent training post   
Very easy  Easy  Difficult  Very difficult  Total 
The possibility of migration 
did not have effect 
1  23  20  6  50 
The possibility of migration 
had an effect 
6  24  29  21  80 
Total  7  47  49  27  130 
 
Chi squared     7.03 
Degrees of freedom  3 
Table 15. The effect of migration on decisions and assessments of difficulty of finding a 
decent training post.   44
 
India  Low income countries  Middle income 
countries 
High income countries 
  No. obs  Mean  No. obs  Mean  No. obs  Mean  No. obs  Mean 
Free  57  0.70  28  0.57  28  0.39  23  0.74 
Scholarship  57  0.23  28  0.14  28  0.39  23  0.04 
Grant  57  0.04  28  0.14  28  0.07  23  0.04 
Gift  57  0.02  28  0.07  28  0.04  23  0.00 
Corporate 
sponsor 
57  0.02  28  0.00  28  0.04  23  0.00 
Private 
means 
57  0.82  28  0.75  28  0.68  23  0.78 
Borrowing  57  0.12  28  0.04  28  0.29  23  0.22 
 
Table 16. Sources of funding for education 
 
  Low income  Middle income  High income  India 
Support spouse 
and children 
12  0.08  13  0.00  7  0.00  30  0.03 
Support other 
relatives 
12  0.83  13  0.38  7  0.14  30  0.73 
Pay off debts  12  0.00  13  0.31  7  0.00  30  0.23 
Investments  12  0.17  13  0.23  7  0.14  30  0.23 
Saving  12  0.25  13  0.31  7  0.71  30  0.47 
Other  12  0.33  13  0.15  7  0.29  30  0.20 
 







   45
 
with educ. 
With educ + migrn 




Figure 1: Mountford – the possibility of migration raises expected returns to education. 
Amin  A**  A*  Amax 
Figure 2: Mountford with perfect screening: the incentives for the marginal student do not 
change because they will never be chosen for migration. 
with educ. 
With educ + migrn 
E(with educ + migrn) 
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Appendix 
 




Hello, I’m calling from the University of Sussex .My name is _______. You participated a 
study by the Open University and kindly volunteered to participate another survey by a sister 
project. The aim of this survey is to study the reasons and implications of migration of 
doctors. Would you have 20 minutes to answer some questions? You can refuse to answer 
any of the questions if you wish. All your answers will naturally be anonymous and treated 
with confidentiality. The data will be eventually used for academic research. 
 
1.  What is your country of origin?____________________________  
<If asked to clarify: country of birth.> 
 
<If UK, do not continue.> 
Thank you for your time, good bye. etc. 
 
<If overseas, proceed.> 
 
Part 1 Personal details 
 
2.  Gender_____________ 
 
3.  Age_______________ 
 
4.  Marital status: Married/Single 
 
<If married ask questions 5 and 6. > <If single, go to 7.> 
5.  Is you spouse from the UK or overseas? UK/Overseas 
 
6.  Does you spouse live in the UK? Yes/No  
 
7.  Do you have dependants (children)? Yes/No 
 
8.  What is your GMC registration status? Provisional/Limited/Full 
 
9.  What is your current visa status? 
 
Settled status/indefinite residence  Oe 
Training and work experience certificate 
(TWES) 
Oe 
Work permit  Oe 
Permit free status  Oe 
Unknown  Oe 
 
10.  Do you have refugee status? Yes/No   47
 
 
Part 2 Professional background 
 
11.  What was your first medical degree__________________________________ 
 
12.  Institution and the year of obtaining the first medical degree 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
13.  Class or grade of the degree, converted into the following categories: 
 
Excellent  Oe 
Good  Oe 
Average  Oe 
Degree not graded  Oe 
 
 
<In the following questions “home country” means primarily the country of origin, and this 
should be mentioned. However, if the respondent considers some other non-UK country as 
his or her home, make a note on this and ensure that in the future questions “home country” is 
understood consistently referring to this country.>  
 
14.  Describe briefly your work history in different countries (the number of years of 
professional experience, including postgraduate training, and when it took place) 
since obtaining the first medical degree: 





<If any in the home country questions 15 - 18> 
<If none in the home country, go to question 19> 
 
15.  How many of those in your home country in the private 
sector?____________________________________ 
 
16.  Was your last post in your home country in public or private sector? 
 
Public sector  oe 
Private sector  oe 
 
17.  Was it located in rural or urban areas? 
 
Rural  oe 
Urban  oe 
 
18.  What type of institution was it?   48
 
Hospital  oe 
Health care centre/Surgery  oe 
 
 
19.  Reason for going abroad for further training, please tick all those that apply:  
 
  Yes  No 
A. To obtain reputable training and advance career 
thereafter 
Oe  Oe 
B. Financial advantages or higher standard of living  oe  oe 
C. Departmental connections/sponsorship/specific 
placements  
oe  oe 
D. Personal reasons  oe  oe 
E. Other 
(specify)………………………………………………... 
oe  oe 
 
 
20.  What was your grade prior to entry to the UK (as UK equivalent) and in which 
country was that?_______________________________________ 
 
PRHO oe  SHO oe  SpR oe  Consultant oe  Other (specify) oe  ………………………….... 
 
21.  How good were the facilities (equipment, supporting staff etc.) provided in the last 
post you held in that grade prior to coming to the UK? 
 
Very good  Oe 
Good  Oe 
Inadequate  Oe 
Completely inadequate  Oe 
 
22.  How difficult is it to get a decent medical training post in your home country with 
your qualifications? 
 
Very difficult  Oe 
Difficult  Oe 
Easy  Oe 
Very easy  Oe 
 
23.  Where was your first training post? __________________________   49
 
24.  How long did it take for you to find your first post after obtaining your degree?  
 
Less than a month  Oe 
1-2 months  Oe 
3-6 months  Oe 
More than 6 months  Oe 
 
25.  What was your employment situation when you left for the UK? 
 
Working (including postgraduate training) in home country  Oe 
Unemployed  Oe 
Not working for some other reason, or working elsewhere  Oe 
 
<If employed, question 26.> <If not employed, go to question 27.> 
 
26.  In your view, how difficult was it for your last employer in your home country to find 
equally qualified applicant to replace you? 
 
Very difficult  Oe 
Difficult  Oe 
Easy  Oe 
Very easy  Oe 
 
27.  In your view, how difficult in general is it for employers to find suitably qualified 
doctors in your home country? 
 
Very difficult  Oe 
Difficult  Oe 
Easy  Oe 
Very easy  Oe 
 
 
28.  What is you current grade in the UK? 
 
PRHO  Oe  SHO  Oe  SpR(Type I)  Oe  SpR(Type II)  oe 
Locum  Oe  Trust Doctor  Oe  Staff Grade  Oe  Clinical Fellow  oe 
Clinical 
Attachment 
Oe  Associate Specialist  Oe  Other (specify)  Oe  …………………… 
 
29.  What year did you take up your current grade (in the 
UK)?_________________________   50
 
30.  Was your first clinical experience in the UK in this grade? Yes/No 
 
<If no, questions 31 and 32.> <If yes, go to question 33.> 
 
31.  What was your first clinical experience in the UK? 
 
PRHO  Oe  SHO  Oe  SpR(Type I)  Oe  SpR(Type II)  oe 
Locum  Oe  Trust Doctor  Oe  Staff Grade  Oe  Clinical Fellow  oe 
Clinical 
Attachment 
Oe  Associate Specialist  Oe  Other (specify)  Oe  …………………… 
 
32. What year did you take up your first post in the UK? _________________________ 
 
33. Have you experienced spells of involuntary unemployment as a qualified doctor in the 
UK? Yes/No 
 
34. Have you experienced spells of involuntary unemployment as a qualified doctor in your 
home country? Yes/No 
 
 
35. What was your route to entry to the UK? 
 
 
PLAB  Oe   
Direct Placement  Oe   
ODTS  Oe   
EEA member  Oe   
PLAB exempt 
(med. Degree 
recognised)              
oe   
Other (specify)  Oe  ……………………………………………………… 
 
<If EEA, PLAB exempt or other, go to question 39.> 
<If direct placement or ODTS, questions 37 & 38.> 
<If PLAB, question 36.>   51
36. How many times did you attempt PLAB test before passing it? (Note: if there is different 
number of attempts in part I and part II, use the higher number) 
 
Only once  oe 
Twice  oe 
Three times  oe 
More than three times  Oe 
 
<Go to question 39.> 
 
37.  How difficult did you find it to obtain a direct placement or place in the overseas 
doctors’ training scheme? 
 
Very difficult  oe 
Difficult  oe 
Easy  oe 
Very easy  oe 
 
38.  In your view, how difficult is it to obtain a placement or place in the overseas doctors’ 
training scheme for doctors from your country in general? 
 
Very difficult  oe 
Difficult  oe 
Easy  oe 




39.  Have you ever applied for a post through normal routes (i.e. by sending applications 
directly to the hospitals/surgeries) in the UK? Yes/No 
 
<If yes, questions 40, 41 and 42.> <If no, go to 43.> 
 
40.  How difficult did you find it to find a post in the UK? 
 
Very difficult  Oe 
Difficult  Oe 
Easy  Oe 
Very easy  Oe 
   52
 
41. When applying for your last post, approximately how many applications did you send? 
 
1-5  Oe  6-10  Oe  11-20  Oe 
21-50  Oe  Over 50  Oe     
 
 
42.  In your view, how difficult is finding a post (outside ODTS or a direct placement 
scheme) in the UK for doctors from your country in general? 
 
Very difficult  Oe 
Difficult  Oe 
Easy  Oe 
Very easy  Oe 
 
 
Part 3 Educational decisions/finance 
 
43.  Did the prospect of being able to work abroad affect your decisions (please tick all 
those that apply):  
 
  Yes  No 
A. To train in medicine at all  Oe  Oe 
B. On which college/university to apply to  Oe  Oe 
C. On which speciality to adopt  oe  oe 
D. On whether to seek training abroad  oe  oe 
E. On how to finance your training  oe  oe 
F. On how much effort to put into achieving good grades in 
your medical studies 
oe  oe 
 
44.  In your view, does the prospect of working abroad usually affect medical students’ or 
doctors’ decisions in your home country: 
 
  Yes  No 
A. To train in medicine at all  Oe  Oe 
B. On which college/university to apply to  Oe  Oe 
C. On which speciality to adopt  Oe  Oe 
D. On whether to seek training abroad  Oe  Oe 
E. On how to finance your training  Oe  Oe 
F. On how much effort to put into achieving good grades in 
their medical studies 
Oe  Oe 
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45.  How did you finance your medical studies (tick any substantial contributions over one 
quarter of total cost)?  (Total cost refers to tuition fees and living costs.) 
 
A. Public provision of training (basically free at point of 
delivery, also including training where work is required in 
return) 
Oe 
B. Competitive scholarship (please specify from which 
country …………………………………………………….) 
Oe 
C. Public student grants or benefits (please specify from 
which country……………………………….) 
Oe 
D. Gift/Personal sponsors  Oe 
E. Corporate sponsorship  Oe 
F.  Private means (incl. parents and own savings)  Oe 
G. Borrowing  Oe 
 
46.  Did/does your postgraduate training in the UK involve any direct costs to you? 
Yes/No 
 
<If yes, question 47.> <If no, go to 48.> 
 
47.  How are you financing or did finance the personal, direct costs of your postgraduate 
training in the UK (tick any substantial contributions over one quarter of total cost)? 
 
A. Competitive scholarship  Oe 
B. Gift/Personal sponsors  Oe 
C. Corporate sponsorship  Oe 
D. Private means  Oe 
E.  Borrowing  Oe 
 
48. To your knowledge, does some other body or organisation pay some of the costs of your 
training on your behalf? Yes/No 
<If yes, 49> <If no, go to 50.> 
 
49.  Which organisation?______________________________________ 
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50.  In the light of your experience in the UK, do you think you should have made 
different decisions about: 
 
  Yes  No 
A. On whether to train medicine at all with the plan to go 
abroad 
oe  Oe 
B. On whether to seek training in the UK  oe  Oe 
C. On where in the UK to seek a post  oe  Oe 
D. On which speciality to adopt  oe  Oe 
E. On how to finance your training  oe  Oe 
 
 
Part 4 Salary and remittances 
 
51.  What would be your annual salary in your home country now, if you had continued working 
there until now, compared to your current 
salary?______________________________________ 
 
52.  What is the approximate salary in your current grade in your home country, 
compared to your current salary? _________________________________________ 
 
53.  Do you send remittances to your home country? Yes/No 
 
<If any remittances, questions 54 & 55> <If no, go to 56.> 
 
54.  How much do you send to your home country as remittances, compared to your 
current salary?____________________________________________ 
 
55.  What is the purpose of these remittances? Please tick all that apply. 
 
  Yes  No 
A Contribute to living costs of spouse and children  Oe  Oe 
B. Contribute to living costs of other relatives  Oe  Oe 
C. Pay off debts  Oe  Oe 
D. Investments to generate returns  Oe  Oe 
E. Saving for the future use  Oe  Oe 
F. Other, please specify   Oe  Oe 
   55
 
Part 5 Future plans 
 
56.  Do you intend to: 
 
A. Return to your home country  Yes  oe        No  oe     Don’t know oe 
B. Emigrate to a third country  Yes, 
specify………
……….. oe 
      No  oe     Don’t know oe 
 
<If don’t know to A, go to question 63> 
<If no to A, go to question 61> 
<If yes to A, questions 57, 58 and 59> 
 
57. If you intend to return to your home country when will you return: 
 
A. In 1-2 years  Oe 
B. In 3-4 years  Oe 
C. In 5-6 years  Oe 
D. In 7-10 years  Oe 
E. In 10+ years  Oe 
 
58.  What will be the main reasons for your return? Please tick all that apply. 
 
  Yes  No 
A. Because of family reasons  Oe  Oe 
B. Because of duty to serve the home country  Oe  Oe 
C. Lack of job opportunities in the UK  Oe  Oe 
D. Difficulties to get a visa or a residence permit   Oe  Oe 
E. Because you do not want to settle in the UK  Oe  Oe 
F. Better career opportunities at home  Oe  Oe 
G. Better connections and networks at home  Oe  Oe 
H. Other 
(specify)………………………………………. 
Oe  Oe 
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58. Where are you most likely to work in your home country immediately after your return? 
 
Public sector  Oe 
Private sector  Oe 
 
 
Rural  Oe 
Urban  Oe 
 
 
Hospital  Oe 
Health care centre/Surgery  Oe 
 
 
59. Are you likely to still work in this type of institution five (5) years after your return? 
Yes/No 
 
<If yes, go to question 63.> 
<If no, question 60.> 
 
60. Where are you most likely to work 5 years after your return? 
 
Public sector  Oe 
Private sector  Oe 
 
 
Rural  Oe 
Urban  Oe 
 
 
Hospital  Oe 
Health care centre/Surgery  Oe 




61. Which of the following reasons have influenced your decision not to go back to your 
home country? (Please tick all those that apply.) 
 
  Yes  No 
A. Want to gain further experience  Oe  Oe 
B. Better working conditions  Oe  Oe 
C. Better facilities  Oe  Oe 
D. UK health system  Oe  Oe 
E. Working relationships with peers/seniors/managers  Oe  Oe 
F. Working relationships with juniors/other health care 
professionals 
Oe  Oe 
G. For family/personal reasons  Oe  Oe 
H. An improved standard of living  Oe  Oe 
I. Other (specify)  Oe  Oe 
 
62.  Under what conditions (in your home country) would you decide to return? Please 
tick all that apply. 
 
  Yes  No 
A. Better facilities or working conditions  Oe  Oe 
B. Higher salary, at least………………………..per annum  Oe  Oe 
C. Different organisation of health care  Oe  Oe 
D. Different working relationships  Oe  Oe 
E. Under no conditions  Oe  Oe 
F. Other (specify)  Oe  Oe 
 
 
63.  When you first came to the UK, did you intend to stay after your training? Please tick 
all that apply. 
 
Yes  oe        No  oe     Don’t know oe 
 
<if Yes/No and respondent does not know whether to return home or emigrate to a third 
country, or if don’t know in 63, finish> 
<If yes and respondent also currently intends to stay, finish> 
<If no and respondent also currently intends to return or move to a third country, finish>  
<If yes in question 63, but respondent currently intends to return or move to a third country, 
question 65> 
<If no, but respondent currently has no intention to return or move to a third country, go to 
question 64>   58
 
64.  If you did not intend to stay, but have changed your mind, why? Please tick all that 
apply. 
 
  Yes  No 
A. Facilities and working conditions are better than expected.  Oe  Oe 
B. Standard of living is higher than expected.  Oe  Oe 
C. Cultural differences are smaller than expected.  Oe  Oe 
D. Work experience in the UK seems more useful than 
expected. 
Oe  Oe 
E. Career prospects are better than expected.  Oe  Oe 




65.  If you intended to stay, but now intend to leave, why? Please tick all that apply. 
 
  Yes  No 
A. Facilities and working conditions are worse than expected.  Oe  Oe 
B. Standard of living is lower than expected.  Oe  Oe 
C. Cultural differences are larger than expected.  Oe  Oe 
D. Experience in the UK is not likely to be as useful as 
expected. 
Oe  Oe 
E. Career prospects in the UK are worse than expected.  Oe  Oe 
F. Other (please specify)  Oe  Oe 
 
<Finish.>   59
Appendix 2 
 




Ordered probit for grade attained before coming to the UK (Indian doctors) 
No. obs. 49     
Explanatory variable  Coeff.  Std.error  p 
Experience before coming to the UK  0.225  0.069  0.001 
Top university  -0.115  0.427  0.788 
Female  0.735  0.426  0.085 
Age  -0.015  0.039  0.701 
Excellent degree  -0.343  0.395  0.386 




Probit for choosing ODTS (Indian doctors) 
No. obs. 55     
Explanatory variable  Coeff.  Std. Error  p 
Grade before entry: SpR  2.344  0.760  0.002 
Grade before entry: consultant  3.013  0.994  0.002 
Grade before entry: other  2.822  1.237  0.022 
Top university  0.522  0.631  0.409 
Excellent degree  0.794  0.530  0.134 
Entry cohort  0.023  0.055  0.671 
Experience before coming to the 
UK, years 
-0.054  0.059  0.361 
Constant  -2.760  1.329  0.038 
 
Ordered probit for the level of facilities   
No. obs. 105     
Variable  coefficient  std dev   p 
Middle income country  -0.418  0.366  0.253 
High income country  1.181  0.441  0.007 
India  0.430  0.316  0.174 
Easy to find a decent medical 
training post 
0.575  0.434  0.185 
Difficult to find a decent medical 
training post 
0.052  0.426  0.902 
Very difficult to find a decent 
medical training post 
-0.236  0.467  0.614 
Easy to find qualified applicants  0.141  0.310  0.650 
Difficult to find qualified applicants  0.285  0.342  0.404 
Very difficult to find qualified 
applicants 
0.304  0.643  0.636 
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